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The public is a powerful political actor when it comes to the question of what is to be done 
about law and order. Therefore, public attitudes towards punishment are of central 
importance to criminological inquiry. Research in this area has tended towards national 
(comparative) accounts of ‘punitive attitudes’ and, in an effort to explore correlates of 
punitive attitudes, particular sub-groups have been examined often based on certain 
demographic characteristics such as, for instance, race, gender and/or age. However, very 
little research exists exploring urban and rural variations in punitive attitudes. Yet, 
considering that populations may be widely dispersed from central metropolitan and urban 
areas to rural, regional and very remote areas, it is reasonable to assume that ecological 
factors and aspects of cultural geography impact upon punitive attitudes. To comparatively 
examine punitive attitudes across geographical areas, this study draws on cross-sectional data 
(2004-2015) derived from the Canadian Elections Study (CES). Specifically, the research 
employs a multidimensional measurement of punitive attitudes by exploring geographic 
variations in respondents’ attitudes towards: (i) the goals of punishment; (ii) the intensity of 
penal sanctions; and (iii) specified forms of penal sanctions. The sum of the data is then 
drawn together to develop an index of punitivity, thereby providing a more holistic 
understanding of punitive attitudes. The findings indicate that on each measure the rural 
holds significantly greater punitive attitudes than the urban. The article concludes by 
considering theoretical explanations for these differences, of which future research should 
attend, with particular attention to the shared political logic between penal populism and 
political populism and how this contributes to the urban/rural divide as one of the greatest 
political fault lines in present day politics. 
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Public reactions to crime occupy a significant amount of scholarly attention. Indeed, 
the public is understood as being a powerful political actor when it comes to the question of 
what is to be done about law and order, and therefore their reactions to crime and the 
attitudes which help to shape these reactions are of central importance (see for example Pratt, 
2007). To this end, the opinions of the public have constituted an important area of academic 
investigation generally and particularly within criminology.  
 
Understanding public attitudes towards crime and punishment is important for a 
number of reasons. First, in terms of the bigger picture, they provide us with an idea of 
cultural norms and the perceived role of punishment and crime control in particular societies. 
Additionally, they can serve as a barometer through which we may, for example, understand 
how the public feels about the role of the state or levels of satisfaction when it comes to 
crime and its control (e.g. satisfaction with police/courts). Perhaps most importantly, the 
large and growing body of work on populism and penal populism more specifically shows 
that the public is highly influential in guiding crime policy as many politicians are of the 
belief that penal policies should follow the publics’ view (see Green, 2008). While this is 
perhaps not always in the best interest of sound, empirically informed penal policies, at the 
same time ignoring public opinion can have serious consequences (e.g. loss of confidence in 
democracy/criminal justice system). Yet, in order to engage with public perceptions on law 
and order, we must first grasp how the public feels and therefore it is important to understand 
the public’s values, beliefs and ideals surrounding questions of law and order.  
 
Research in this area has tended towards national accounts of punitive attitudes. For 
example, Doob and Roberts (1983), pioneers of this type of public opinion research, explored 
the Canadian public’s view of sentencing, while more recently Kury and Obergfell-Fuchs 
(2008) examined attitudes to punishment and sentencing in the German context. Additionally, 
comparative research has shown that punitive attitudes differ by country and/or region (see 
van Dijk, van Kersteren & Smit, 2007). Furthermore, in an effort to explore correlates of 
punitive attitudes, particular sub-groups have been examined based on demographic 
characteristics such as race, gender and/or age (see Dodd, 2017; Applegate, Cullen, & Fisher, 
2002; Sprott, 1999).  
 
Focusing specifically on Canada, research suggests that Canadians have shown 
support for both punitive and non-punitive measures alike (e.g., Sprott, 1996; Doob et al., 
1998; Sprott, 1998; Roberts & Hough, 2001; Roberts, 2004; Roberts, Crutcher & Verbrugge, 
2007; Roberts & Sprott, 2008; Meyer & O’Malley, 2005). For example, a consistent finding 
in the literature is that the majority of Canadians hold the view that sentencing is too lenient 
(Doob, 2016). Likewise, Roberts, Crutcher and Verbrugge’s (2007) exploration of punitive 
attitudes in Canada found that while there was strong public support for restorative 
sentencing, promoting a sense of responsibility in the offender and securing reparation for the 
crime victim as sentencing goals, over-half of Canadians also supported the use of mandatory 
minimum sentences. 
 
Comparatively, Canada tends to align with other ‘like’ jurisdictions. For instance, 
Burke (2000) and Gerber and Englehardt-Greer (1996) found similar support for mandatory 
minimum sentences in Australia and the United States respectively. Likewise, Kugler et al’s 
(2013) comparative analysis of cultural differences in punitive attitudes found that, despite 
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having much more lenient sentencing policies, Americans and Canadians did not differ from 
each other in sentencing attitudes, and both assigned slightly longer sentences than Germans.  
 
While recent cross-national data on attitudes to punishment is sparse, the International 
Crime Victimization Surveys indicate that Canada ranks among one of the most punitive 
countries. For example, in the latest iteration (2004/2005), when asked to suggest the penalty 
for a “recidivist burglar”, Canada ranked fifth highest in support of imprisonment at 44 
percent of the 32 countries which responded to this question (van Dijk et al., 2007). By 
contrast, 51 percent of respondents from England and Wales, 47 percent from the United 
States, 40 percent from New Zealand and 33 percent from Australia responded similarly (van 
Dijk et al., 2007). While international comparisons of this nature are difficult to make and 
limitations to public opinion surveys may contribute to volatility (see Roberts & Doob, 1989; 
Gelb, 2008), what we can say for certain is that, in aggregate, Canadians tend to exhibit a 
‘dual character’ of public opinion, showing support for both punitive/non-punitive 
mechanisms alike. Nevertheless, in general, the country appears to align with other Anglo-
Saxon jurisdictions as the public indicates more support for tough measures than, for 
instance, many Nordic or European countries (see Pratt & Eriksson, 2013).  
 
While there is research on punitive attitudes within (and comparing) specific 
countries, very little research exists exploring intra-national differences and, more 
specifically, urban and rural variations in punitive attitudes. Yet, considering that populations 
may be widely dispersed from central metropolitan and urban areas to rural, remote and very 
remote areas, it is reasonable to assume that ecological factors and aspects of cultural 
geography impact upon understandings of what is to be done about crime and its control. The 
limited available research suggests that those who live in rural areas are, in general, less 
tolerant of many crimes and more likely to strongly support punitive approaches to issues of 
law and order than people from metropolitan areas (Donnermeyer & DeKeseredy, 2014; 
Gelb, 2011; DeKeseredy et al., 2007; Donnermeyer, Jobes & Barclay, 2006; Weisheit, 
Falcone, & Wells, 2006; Walker, Collins & Wilson, 1987), yet we have little understanding 
of the attitudes which inform this.  
 
This knowledge is particularly important as nearly a quarter of Canadians live in rural 
communities and, while shrinking relative to the urban, they are still growing (Cooke, 2018). 
Furthermore, in addition to the reasons outlined above, understanding these attitudes and how 
they are formed is especially pertinent when we consider that the urban/rural divide is one of 
the greatest political fault lines in present day politics (e.g. Trump; Brexit) and politicians 
appear increasingly attracted to rural communities who may feel disenfranchised yet, 
together, can exact considerable political power (see Pal & Choudry, 2007, 2014; Speer & 
Jivani, 2017; Lyman, 2016; Tharoor, 2018). For example, research suggests that declining 
health and rising death rates, fear of cultural displacement and more generalised economic 
anxiety have primed these communities (across Western nations) to be receptive to populist 
politics and have been advanced as part of the explanation for President Donald Trump’s 
success with rural voters in the United States (see Goldman et al, 2018; Cox, Lienesch & 
Jones, 2017). Likewise, in terms of political allegiance in Canada, Roy, Perrella and Borden 
(2015) found a clear division with regards to party support according to place of residence in 
that rural residence tended to support conservative parties. Notably, this finding has been 
consistent (Bittner, 2007) and held over-time (Adams, 2008; Marland, 2007; Mackinnon, 
2007; Gidengil et al., 2006; Blais et al., 2002) with explanations pointing to a variety of 
factors including, for example, differences within questions of moral traditionalism (Cutler & 
Jenkins, 2000).  
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Exploring comparative penal attitudes as, at least theoretically, a part of this political 
fault line is especially relevant given the rise of penal populism in the last three decades and 
the relationship and similarities this particular form of populism shares with political 
populism more generally (e.g. anti-elitism) (Unnever & Cullen, 2010; Brown & Piscitelli, 
2016; Pratt & Miao, 2017). As argued elsewhere, traditions of penal moderation (see Webster 
& Doob, 2015, 2007) and Canadian ‘exceptionalism’ to wider punitive trends represent a 
microcosm of a much more encompassing and deeply embedded ‘elite political culture’ 
(Mulrooney, 2018; see also MacFarlane, 2017; Adams; 2014; Bricker & Ibbitson, 2013; 
Flanagan, 2009: prelude; Owram (1986); Granatstein, 1982), of which its commitment to 
small-l liberal values, the institutionalization of these values (e.g., the Supreme Court of 
Canada), and the structural manifestations of these cultural concerns (e.g., the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms) helped to facilitate, if not mandate, such a moderate penal 
culture. In recent times, this notion of a liberal elitist political culture has been extended and 
applied to theoretically explain what is understood as ‘Canadian exceptionalism’ to the 
broader political populism that is sweeping many Western liberal democracies (see Kristof, 
2016; Liberty moves north, 2016; The last liberals, 2016; Marche, 2016).  
 
As Adams (2014) argues, elite opinion and action in Canada has starkly contrasted 
with public sentiment on a number of policy issues, including the abolition of the death 
penalty, the liberalization of abortion and the legalization of same-sex marriage. Yet, 
overtime, public opinion eventually came to align with that of the elites. However, a small 
yet growing amount of the public remained unimpressed with the elitist drift of the country 
(Bricker & Ibbitson, 2013; Adams, 2014). This anti-elitist backlash came to the fore with the 
rise of a new ‘right-wing’ populist style of conservativism ushered in by the Conservative 
Party of Canada between 2005-2015. As Webster and Doob (2015) suggest, this new 
government represented a completely different ‘breed’ of conservatism that Canada had 
never seen before (p. 3) and re-organized Canada’s political landscape, not least in matters of 
crime and justice. While this government’s populist approach received significant resistance 
in the media, legal and, to a lesser extent, political spheres they notably remained in 
government for a decade and, most importantly, shattered the long-standing political 
consensus centred on liberal elitism; the genie of public emotions towards crime, and indeed 
politics more generally, was let out of the bottle (Loader, 2006). 
 
With this in mind, the urban/rural political divide and the rise of a broader political 
populism warrants a closer inspection. This macro generalization of a liberal ‘political 
culture’ and ‘penal culture’ may be significantly challenged when exploring attitudes on a 
micro-level where individual identities and values may be shaped by more immediate cultural 
norms and values and are therefore outside, and perhaps at odds with, the broader national 
psyche crafted in large part by liberal elites. Add to this the evidence that people who live in 
rural communities tend to support conservative parties and that those who support 
conservative parties tend to hold more punitive attitudes (Tonry, 1999; Jacobs & Helms, 
1996; Beckett & Western, 2001; Smith, 2004; Yates & Fording, 2005; Loader & Sparks, 
2016) and we can hypothesise that the ‘rural voice’ in Canada will not only contrast starkly to 
the elite led traditions of penal moderation but also to their urban counterparts.  
 
To this end, this article marks an initial foray into these theoretical concerns, filling a 
gap in the literature, by first examining whether rural communities in Canada do in fact have 
a greater affinity for punitive attitudes and considering the implications of these findings in 
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terms of causal mechanisms. The answers to such questions are vitally important for 
engaging with these communities on issues of law and order and beyond.  
 
Conceptualizing punitive attitudes  
 
Punitiveness or punitivity has received a lot of criticism for being a loosely defined 
and highly under-theorized concept which has been over-applied and, at times, misapplied in 
the extant literature (see Matthews, 2005). Much of these issues stem from a lack of clarity 
over what exactly it is we are talking about when we say punitiveness, as well as the absence 
of empirically and theoretically informed attempts to measure the concept. Kury, Kania and 
Obergfell-Fuchs (2004) provide a good starting point by suggesting that we employ an 
“onion model” which differentiates between three “skins” or layers of punitivity on a macro, 
meso and micro level. The macro level refers to those social discourses and cultural 
sensibilities which inform debates that tend to play out in the media, as well as political 
conversations around crime and punishment. From the perspective of comparative criminal 
justice research, here we can consider those macro comparisons of penal cultures of, for 
example, American punitiveness versus Dutch tolerance or Nordic exceptionalism (see 
Downes, 1988; Pratt & Eriksson, 2013).  
 
On the meso-level are those aspects which tend to concern the administration of 
justice and can include issues related to the number or length of prisons sentences handed 
down by judges or the role of prosecutors (see Pfaff, 2017). Here we are really concerned 
with the specific actions of state actors (such as the police, prosecutors or the judiciary) when 
it comes to matters of law and order. The micro-level, which is the focus of this article, 
concerns itself with attitudinal orientations towards crime and punishment in the general 
populace. That is, if the macro-level is concerned with the punitivity of Canada as a 
jurisdiction, and the meso-level with that of the Canadian judiciary, then the micro level 
attends to an individual Canadian’s need for punishment and is therefore interested in their 
values, beliefs and ideals surrounding questions of what is to be done about law and order.  
 
A large and growing body of international literature has sought to measure punitive 
attitudes in a variety of ways. Early work in this vein tended towards very general questions, 
therefore providing a very incomplete understanding of what is in fact a complex construct 
(see Doob & Roberts, 1988). For instance, asking respondents whether sentences handed 
down by the judiciary are “too harsh”, “not harsh enough” or “just about right” is 
problematic, not least because respondents tend to have the worst kinds of offenders in mind 
when answering this question (Gelb, 2008; Hough & Roberts, 2002).  
 
As the field developed, in an effort to capture the complexity of these attitudes, 
scholars began to ask more specific questions (Unnever, Cullen & Roberts, 2005). Some have 
focused on attitudes towards the goals of punishment which refers to what an individual feels 
the criminal justice wants to accomplish when it comes to responding to crime; for example, 
to seek vengeance, to incapacitate, to deter and/or to rehabilitate (see Doob & Roberts, 1988; 
Pfeiffer, Windzio & Kleimann, 2005; Roberts et al., 2009). In this case, those who support 
retribution, incapacitation or deterrence for a particular crime/offender would be seen as more 
punitive than those who support rehabilitative ideals.  
 
Research has also considered specific forms of penal sanctions by determining one’s 
support, or lack thereof, for a means of punishment for a particular crime/offender such as, 
for example imprisonment, community sanctions etc. (see Young, 1992; Grasmick, Bursik & 
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Blackwell, 1993; Unnever, Cullen & Applegate, 2005; Robbers, 2006; Ramirez, 2013) and/or 
along a continuum of penal sanctions (see Doob & Roberts, 1988; Hough & Roberts, 2002; 
Kury & Obergfell-Fuchs, 2008). By this measure, those in support of imprisonment and/or 
with very little support of probation would be seen as punitive and vice versa.  
 
Additionally, scholars have considered the intensity of penal sanctions by measuring 
one’s desire to see offenders punished. Quantitatively this is concerned with desires for the 
number of people punished as well as issues relating to the length of prisons sentences or cost 
of fines, while qualitatively the concern is with the desired conditions of punishment (see 
King & Maruna, 2009). In this case, those who support longer and more austere forms of 
punishment for a wider variety of offenders, whether this be in terms of offence type or 
offender specific characteristics, would be seen as more punitive than those who do not. 
Finally, studies have tended to explore sentencing specifically by determining an individual’s 
support for punitive and non-punitive sentencing options for a particular crime/offender (see 
Applegate & Cullen, 1996; Roberts & Hough, 2005, Mitchell & Roberts, 2012). By this 
measure, those in favour of the death penalty, three-strikes policies or mandatory minimum 
sentences, for example, would be seen as punitive, while those who supported house-arrest or 
parole, for instance, would be seen as non-punitive in their attitudinal orientation.  
 
Nevertheless, while research has broadened its scope by highlighting particular 
crimes/offenders and examining more specific facets of punitiveness (e.g. intensity of 
sanctions), Adriaenssen and Aertsen (2015) argue that, on their own, these measures can tell 
us very little as they merely shed light on one or two elements of punitive attitudes. Rather, 
the authors advance a multidimensional concept of punitive attitudes which is concerned with 
the public’s attitudes across these four key indicators: (i) an attitude towards the goals of 
punishment; (ii) specified forms of penal sanctions; (iii) the intensity of penal sanctions; and 
(iv) specific sentencing policies.  
 
Through this multidimensional understanding of punitive attitudes, researchers may 
identify specific attitudes across these four dimensions providing a much more nuanced 
measurement of punitive attitudes. For instance, depending on the answers given, participants 
may hold consistent (non)-punitive attitudes across all four domains or some mix by, for 
instance, feeling that the goal of the criminal justice system should be concerned with 
rehabilitation while also showing strong support for the death penalty as a particular form of 
punishment for certain offenders (e.g. those who have murdered). Perhaps most importantly, 
when taken together, the sum of the data may be drawn together to develop an index of 




To comparatively examine punitive attitudes across rural and urban geographical 
areas, this study draws on cross-sectional data derived from the Canadian Elections Study 
(CES). The CES is a large body of survey data that has been gathered and analysed for over 
five decades (1965-present). The main objective of the CES is to explain what makes people 
decide to vote (or not to vote), and, if they do, what makes them decide to support a given 
party or candidate, and why parties gain or lose ground from one election to another.  
 
Nevertheless, the CES probes a significant number of topics. For example, the 2006 
CES encompassed nearly 6,700 variables including demographic characteristics and 
locational data, as well as questions dealing with topics from political interests and political 
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efficacy to issue orientations and media exposure, among many others. CES surveys are 
randomly administered to a national sample, predominately over the telephone but also via 
mail-back survey and, more recently, the internet, to eligible Canadian voters during and after 
a federal election (and/or referendum). The robust sample size of the CES along with the 
breadth of topics explored allows for a representative, detailed and sophisticated analysis of a 
variety of variables, including an examination of different sub-groups (e.g. male/female). 
However, it is important to note that while the CES provides a representative sample of the 
Canadian population, certain regions and provinces are better represented while others, such 
as the Yukon and Northwest Territories, remain less well represented due to the low inclusion 
of cases from these regions. For a more detailed overview of the CES see Kanji, Bilodeau 
and Scotto (2012).  
 
The data utilized in this paper draws on the 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2015 CES. This 
time period was chosen for two reasons. First, the choice was a practical one. Given the CES 
was run four times in this ten-year time period, it was determined that the cross-sectional data 
was robust and allowed for the exploration of contemporary attitudes towards punishment. 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, this decade is particularly relevant as the rise of the 
Conservative Party of Canada (2006-2015) to power saw (penal) populism dominate the 
political arena in a way never before seen in Canadian history (Webster & Doob, 2015; 
Mulrooney, 2018). Thus, in contrast to a long-standing history of elitism wherein penal 
policy making was the purview of elites, law and order was at the forefront a public and 
political thought and discourse during this time-period (see Mulrooney, forthcoming).  
 
Closely connected to this, a ten-year period is also manageable when it comes to 
contextualizing the data in terms of socio-political changes that may have occurred, as well as 
theorizing explanations with respect to the results. For instance, we could hypothesise that a 
decade of law and order discourse from the federal government would see Canadian’s 
attitudes towards punishment harden or, as discussed below, consider how the current wider 
political climate may shape the results. Nevertheless, while this methodological choice 
allowed for a purposeful, theoretical and contextually informed analysis, its primary 
limitation is that it lacks the historical data from which to make comparisons (i.e. rural/urban 
attitudes prior to these changes which occurred in the political arena).  
 
While the publicly available CES is predominately utilized by political scientists there 
is much untapped data of interest to criminologists. Perhaps most importantly, for our 
purposes here, the data set allows for cross-sectional explorations of punitive attitudes and 
comparisons of these attitudes by geographical area. Specifically, the CES not only collects 
data on the province in which respondents live, but also the Federal electoral districts in 
which they reside. Federal electoral districts are geographically bound constituencies that 
elect Members of Parliament to Canada's House of Commons every election.  
 
Drawing on Federal electoral districts we are able to make comparisons across rural 
and urban geographical areas by organizing these districts accordingly. The more difficult 
issue posed by such a classification is operationalizing the rural and the urban. Those 
exploring this dichotomy have pursued a number of avenues. For instance, Farmers Forum, 
an independent farm newspaper exploring issues that affect farm life in the province of 
Ontario, considered any Federal electoral district with fewer than 100 people per square 
kilometre rural. In contrast, Statistics Canada, the countries national statistical office, recently 
developed a much more complex remoteness index which prioritized accessibility and 
included the summation of the sizes of the population centres that can be reached by 
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community, a measure of the proximity of each population centre to community and set 
travel time from the community (Alasia et al, 2017).  
 
Given the available information, we were required to develop our classification on the 
former, and indeed most readily employed classification which is based on population 
density. Statistics Canada data on “Population and Dwelling Count” derived from the 
Canadian Census conveniently provides population density per square kilometre for each 
Federal electoral district. As our intention was to develop a meaningful comparison between 
the rural and the urban, instead of creating an arbitrary cut-off point where rural tends to be 
anything from below 100 people per km2 to 400 people per km2 and everything in between, 
we developed a third category known as ‘rurban’ to deal with the few ridings that pose a 
particularly unique challenge.  
 
The rurban category included those ridings with between 150-300 people per km2. 
These ridings are an eclectic mix of the rural and the urban in that, thanks to population 
growth and city expansion, they include populated urban areas (e.g. commuter suburbs) but 
also a vast spread of semi-populated rural land. Thus, for example, those who work in 
Toronto, Ontario commuting from the suburban riding of Durham Region (Ontario) may well 
see themselves as urban, yet farmers, long-established families and/or those outside of 
suburban housing developments in these communities may well strongly disagree with this 
assessment. While the rurban group was included in the preliminary analysis, it is not 
presented in these results because the main focus of this article is on comparisons between 
the rural and the urban and there were few significant differences to report within this 
category. Yet, identifying these relatively small number of ridings (12 to 16, depending on 
the year) left us with a more reliable comparison of rural and urban communities, the former 
including those with less than 150 people per km2 and the latter those with more than 300 
people per km2.  
 
It is important to note that, as the CES data drawn on spanned 2004-2015, these 
classifications changed slightly as ridings were re-organized, new electoral districts came into 
effect and calculations were made using the closest available census data on population 
density. Thus, for the 2004 and 2008 data set the variables were created using the 2003 
Representation Order which included 308 Federal electoral districts and the 2006 Census 
population data; the 2011 data set drew on the 2003 Representation Order and the 2011 
Census data; and, finally, the 2015 data set drew on the most recent 2013 Representation 
Order, which now included 338 Federal electoral districts, and the 2016 Census population 
data. Such changes led to very few differences between the data sets in terms of 
rural/rurban/urban variables: in 2004 and 2008 there were 150 rural ridings, 16 rurban ridings 
and 142 urban ridings; in 2011 this changed to 146, 16 and 146 respectively; and, finally, in 
2015 this changed to 150, 12 and 176 respectively. Despite these changes, there are still clear 
sub-categories of rural, rurban and urban from which to undertake a detailed and 
sophisticated comparative analysis. 
 
Once the classification variables were operationalised and developed, the next step 
was to determine the data relevant to punitive attitudes, with particular consideration given to 
the multi-dimensional definition of punitive attitudes outlined above. As we were drawing on 
an existing data set, the trade-off for robust cross-sectional data meant that the questions 
asked were developed without this multi-dimensional definition in mind. Nevertheless, with 
the data available, we were able to draw on three questions to serve as proxies for the 
dimensions of punitiveness. The first question asked respondents: What is the BEST way to 
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deal with young offenders who commit violent crime? With this question, we are able to grasp 
what the respondents think the goal of punishment should be in this case (e.g. to punish or to 
rehabilitate) as well as something about their support for punitive and non-punitive 
sentencing options more broadly.  
 
In 2004 and 2008 respondents were given the following choices: (1) give them 
tougher sentences; (2) spend more rehabilitating them; (3) focus on parents, home life, 
community values, morals; (4) enrol them in an army/boot camp; (5) preventative measures, 
e.g., education; (6) depends on the situation; (7) both 1 and 1; and (8) don’t know. While this 
question was also asked in 2011 and 2015, respondents were confined to the choices of (1) 
give them tougher sentences; (2) spend more on rehabilitating them; and (3) not sure.  
 
Subsequently, as the intention was to explore comparative variations with respect to 
the goals of sentencing, the response categories were collapsed into “Punish” and 
“Prevent/Rehabilitate” with the former including those that sought to punish (e.g. give them 
tougher sentences and enrol them in army/boot camp) and latter including those with a 
preference for rehabilitative and preventative measures (e.g. spend more rehabilitating them; 
focus on parents, home life, community values, morals; preventative measures). “Not sure” 
was excluded due to the low response in this category.  
 
The second question asked respondents to indicate their agreement (or lack thereof) 
with the following statement: We must crack down on crime, even if that means that 
criminals lose their rights. The response categories of (1) strongly agree; (2) agree; (3) 
disagree; (4) strongly disagree; and (5) not sure were collapsed into (1) agree and (2) disagree 
in order to clearly differentiate between those who were in support of this statement and those 
who indicated they were against the statement, while “not sure” was excluded given the low 
response in this category.  
 
This question provides insight into the respondents’ preferences around the intensity 
of penal sanctions in that agreement/disagreement with this statement would indicate whether 
respondents were comfortable with limiting individual rights in the name of increasing the 
certainty of punishment. Finally, the third question posed asked respondents a classic 
question which allows us to measure support for a specific form of penal sanction and 
specific sentencing option: Do you favour or oppose the death penalty for people convicted of 
murder? The response categories for this question included (1) favour; (2) oppose; and (3) 
not sure. Notably, the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011 data reported a “depends” category if 
volunteered by the respondent (e.g. not a given option). For the reasons outlined above, the 
response categories were collapsed into (1) favor and (2) oppose.  
 
Additionally, the results of the individual questions were combined to develop a 
punitivity index. To give equal weighting, the questions were adjusted to provide a score 1 – 
2. What is the best way to deal with young offenders who commit violent crime? was coded as 
punish (1) and prevent/rehabilitate (2). We must crack down on crime, even if that means that 
criminals lose their rights was coded as agree (1) and disagree (2). Finally, do you favour or 
oppose the death penalty for people convicted of murder? was recoded favour (1) and oppose 
(2). Scores were then summed between 3-6 and the sample was divided into a bi-modal 
distribution. Low scores indicate a more punitive attitude and high scores a less punitive 
attitude.   
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In order to gather our sample from the data set, participants had to have answered the 
punitivity questions and revealed their geographical information. Notably, to run the 
puntivity index participants must have answered all three questions in a given year and 
therefore those who did not were excluded from the sample. The total sample drawn on for 
this study included 4605 participants who answered all three punitivity questions, of which 
2518 were rural and 2087 were urban.  
All analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 25. Descriptive 
statistics were conducted for all variables of interest. For each question used in the punitivity 
index, crosstabs analysis were conducted with the residential location of the participants as 
the dependent variable. Chi-square tests for independence and tests for linear trends were 
conducted and significance was set at p = .05. A logistic regression analysis was performed to 
determine the independent predictors of punitivity. 
Findings 
Punitive Attitudes in Canada 
The goals of punishment 
Canadians are polarized on the best way to deal with young offenders who commit 
violent crime. For instance, in both 2004 and 2011 nearly 54 percent of Canadians supported 
tougher sentences in contrast to 46 percent who preferred a preventative/rehabilitative 
approach (see Table 1). However, the trendline indicates a significant change in the responses 
of Canadians to this question over time with growing support for a rehabilitative approach. 
For example, while in 2004 only 46.3 percent of respondents supported rehabilitation this 
grew to 59.3 percent by 2015. Taken together, over the decade slightly more Canadians 
favoured a preventative/rehabilitative approach (51.3%) over a punitive one (48.9%).  
Table 1 
What is the best way to deal with 
young offenders who commit violent 
crime? 
YEAR Total 
2004 2008 2011 2015 
All 
participants 
Tougher sentences n 636 662 578 366 2242 
% 53.7% 46.0% 53.4% 40.7% 48.9% 
Rehabilitation n 548 776 505 534 2363 
% 46.3% 54.0% 46.6% 59.3% 51.3% 
Trend <.001 Total n 1184 1438 1083 900 4605 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
The intensity of penal sanctions 
Canadians appear strongly in favour of cracking down on criminals over ensuring 
their rights. Indeed, in 2004, 75.3 percent of respondents agreed with this statement (see 
Table 2). Over the decade we are provided with a similar picture as 67.3 percent of 
Canadians support cracking down on crime even if it meant limiting the rights of offenders 
compared to 32.7 percent of those who disagreed. Notably, however, there has been a 
significant trend of Canadians disagreeing with this statement. For example, agreement with 
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this statement fell by nearly 20 percent to a low of 56.6 percent by 2015. Nevertheless, a 
majority of Canadians (56.6%) still agreed with cracking down on criminals over ensuring 




We must crack down on crime, even if 
that means that criminals lose their 
rights 
YEAR Total 
2004 2008 2011 2015 
All 
participants  
Agree n 892 1009 689 509 3099 
% 75.3% 70.2% 63.6% 56.6% 67.3% 
Disagree n 292 429 394 391 1506 
% 24.7% 29.8% 36.4% 43.4% 32.7% 
Trend <.001 Total n 1184 1438 1083 900 4605 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Specified forms of penal sanctions 
 
The data indicates that significantly more Canadians oppose the death penalty in all 
years the question was asked. For example, as Table 3 indicates, between 2004-2015 
opposition to the death penalty ranged from a high of 58.2 percent in 2011 to a low of 54 
percent in 2004 with support ranging from 41.8 percent and 46 percent respectively. Taken 
together, the data over the decade shows that 56.2 percent of Canadians oppose the death 
penalty, as opposed to 43.8 percent who support this sanction. Notably, over the period from 
2004 to 2015 there has been a significant downward trend in the proportion who favour the 




Favour or oppose the death 
penalty 
YEAR Total 
2004 2008 2011 2015 
All 
participants  
Favour n 545 639 453 380 2017 
% 46.0% 44.4% 41.8% 42.2% 43.8% 
Oppose n 639 799 630 520 2588 
% 54.0% 55.6% 58.2% 57.8% 56.2% 
Trend .04 Total  n 1184 1438 1083 900 4605 




The data is consistent with the notion that Canadians have mixed views on questions 
of punishment, showing support for punitive and non-punitive measures alike. However, 
when taken together, the punitivity index presented in Table 4 indicates that Canadians are, 
on the whole, significantly more punitive than not, with 54.7 percent of Canadians falling 
into the more punitive category and 45.3 percent into the less punitive category in the bi-
modal distribution. Nevertheless, the trendline suggests that Canadians are becoming less 
punitive overtime, with the more punitive category dropping from a high of 59.4 percent in 
2004 to a low of 47.2 percent in 2015, and the less punitive category rising from 40.6 percent 
to 52.8 percent respectively. As support/opposition to the death penalty shows only small 
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changes, this drop in punitiveness is largely driven by more support for 
preventative/rehabilitative approaches to dealing with violent young offenders and especially 
by disagreement with the statement that “we must crack down on criminals even if it means 




Punitivity index  
 
YEAR Total 





n 703 793 596 425 2517 
% 59.4% 55.1% 55.0% 47.2% 54.7% 
Less 
punitive 
n 481 645 487 475 2088 
% 40.6% 44.9% 45.0% 52.8% 45.3% 
Trend <.001 Total n 1184 1438 1083 900 4605 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Comparing Punitive Attitudes: The Urban and the Rural   
 
 The goals of punishment 
 
There was a significant relationship between where people live and their attitudes 
towards punishment for violent young offenders. Namely, it appears that people from rural 
areas are more likely to support punitive measures for young offenders. The cross-tabulation 
revealed key differences in support for tougher sentences and rehabilitation as evidenced by 
the difference in percentages between the rural and urban classifications (see Tables 5, 6 and 
7). For instance, in 2011 58.3 percent of rural respondents preferred punishment for young 
violent offenders in contrast to 47.6 percent of urban respondents. Taken together, over the 
decade we see similar differences with 52.1 percent of rural respondents favouring 
punishment in contrast to 44.5 percent of urban respondents.  
 
As outlined above, the cross-sectional data suggest that, as a whole, support for 
punishment has fallen slightly overtime; though when disaggregated we see that this drop has 
been consistent in the urban classification and more sporadic in the rural (see Table 5 and 6). 
Indeed, there is no significant trend in the rural classification while the urban classification 
shows a significant trend towards less punitive attitudes with growing support for a 
rehabilitative approach to dealing with violent young offenders.  
 
For example, in the rural classification, support for punishment remained relatively 
stable, seeing a dip below 50 percent for the first time in 2008 and climbing up again in 2011 
(58.3%), before reaching its lowest point in 2015 (47%). Conversely, 52.1 percent of urban 
respondents favoured punishment in 2004 and this figure has consistently dropped with only 
35.7 percent favouring punishment in 2015. Subsequently, on this dimension, the gap 
between the urban and the rural has grown considerably.  
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What is the best way to deal with 
young offenders who commit violent 
crime? 
YEAR Total 
2004 2008 2011 2015 
Rural 
participants  
Tougher sentences n 369 418 339 187 1313 
% 54.9% 48.2% 58.3% 47.0% 52.1% 
Rehabilitation n 303 449 242 211 1205 
% 45.1% 51.8% 41.7% 53.0% 47.9% 
Trend .23 
 
Total n 672 867 581 398 2518 




What is the best way to deal with 
young offenders who commit violent 
crime? 
YEAR Total 
2004 2008 2011 2015 
Urban 
participants 
Tougher sentences n 267 244 239 179 929 
% 52.1% 42.7% 47.6% 35.7% 44.5% 
Rehabilitation n 245 327 263 323 1158 




Total  n 512 571 502 502 2087 




What is the best way to deal with young 
offenders who commit violent crime? 
Rural Urban Total 
Tougher sentences 1313 (52.1) 929 (44.5) 2391 (48.8) 
Rehabilitation 1205 (47.9) 1158 (55.5) 2510 (51.2) 
Chi-sq 26.60, 1, p 
<.001 
Total 2518 (100) 2087 (100) 4605 (100) 
 
The intensity of penal sanctions 
 
As the data in Tables 8, 9 and 10 indicate, there was a significant relationship between 
where people live and the intensity of penal sanctions. The cross-tabulations revealed key 
differences on this measure, as evidenced by the difference in percentages between the rural 
and urban classifications. While both the rural and the urban heavily favored cracking down 
on criminals over ensuring their rights, it appears that people from rural areas are 
significantly more likely to support such measures. For example, in 2004 80.7 percent of 
rural respondents and 68.4 percent of urban respondents favored limiting rights. Notably, 
there is a significant trend in both classifications indicating that support for this statement has 
fallen consistently. For instance, by 2015 support for limiting the rights of offenders dropped 
to 64.1 percent of rural respondents and 51.3 percent of urban respondents. However, on this 
dimension, the difference between the rural and urban classification is not only significant 
across all years but has remained above 10 percent for each year surveyed. Indeed, the cross-
sectional data indicates that this difference remains significant over the decade with 73.1 
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percent of rural respondents agreeing with this statement, in contrast to 61 percent of urban 
respondents. Thus, while both classifications appear to be losing an appetite for revoking the 
rights of offenders in the name of cracking down on crime, the gap between the 




We must crack down on crime, even if 




2004 2008 2011 2015  
Rural 
participants 
Agree n 542 640 404 255 1841 
% 80.7% 73.8% 69.5% 64.1% 73.1% 
Disagree n 130 227 177 143 677 
% 19.3% 26.2% 30.5% 35.9% 26.9% 
Trend <.001 
 











We must crack down on crime, even if 
that means that criminals lose their 
rights 
YEAR Total 
2004 2008 2011 2015  
Urban 
participants 
Agree n 350 369 285 254 1258 
% 68.4% 64.6% 56.8% 50.6% 61% 
Disagree n 162 202 217 248 829 
% 31.6% 35.4% 43.2% 49.4% 39.0% 
Trend <.001 Total n 512 571 502 502 2087 




We must crack down on crime, even if that 
means that criminals lose their rights 
Rural Urban Total 
Agree 1841 (73.1) 1258 (61.0)     3099 (67.2) 
Disagree 677 (26.9) 829 (39.0) 1506 (32.8) 
Chi-sq 85.43, 1, p 
<.001 
Total 2518 (100) 2087 (100) 4605 (100) 
 
Specified forms of penal sanctions 
 
Finally, the data indicates there was a significant relationship between where people 
live and their views on the death penalty (see Tables 11, 12 and 13). Specifically, it appears 
that people from rural areas are more likely to support the death penalty while people from 
urban areas are more likely to oppose it. The cross-tabulations revealed key differences in 
support for the death penalty, as evidenced by the difference in percentages between the rural 
and urban classifications.  
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Notably, while the difference between the classifications are significant across the 
years, the most recent figures suggest that the gap between the urban and the rural appears to 
be growing. For example, in 2004 49.1 percent of rural respondents supported the death 
penalty for people convicted of murder in contrast to 42% of urban respondents, a seven 
percent difference. However, 2015 showed the greatest gulf between the classifications as 49 
percent of rural respondents, in contrast to only 36.9 percent of urban respondents indicated 
their favor for the death penalty, an 11.3 percent difference.  
 
Evidently, as a whole, rural respondents showed significantly greater support for, and 
therefore less opposition to, the death penalty across all years with an average of 47.3 percent 
in contrast to 39.6 percent in the urban. Notably, neither category shows a significant trend 




Favour or oppose the death penalty YEAR Total 
2004 2008 2011 2015 
Rural 
participants  
Favour n 330 404 261 195 1190 
% 49.1% 46.6% 44.9% 49.0% 47.3% 
Oppose n 342 463 320 203 1328 
% 50.9% 53.4% 55.1% 51.0% 52.7% 
Trend .65 
 
Total n 672 867 581 398 2518 




Favour or oppose the death penalty YEAR Total 
2004 2008 2011 2015 
Urban 
participants 
Favour n 215 235 192 185 827 
% 42.0% 41.2% 38.2% 36.9% 39.6% 
Oppose n 297 336 310 317 1260 
% 58.0% 58.8% 61.8% 63.1% 60.4% 
Trend .06 Total n 512 571 502 502 2087 




Favour or oppose the death penalty Rural Urban Total 
Favour 1190 (47.3) 827(39.6) 2017 (43.5) 
Oppose 1328 (52.7) 1260 (60.4) 2588 (56.5) 
Chi-sq 27.01, 1, p 
<.001 




The punitivity index indicates that, when that data is taken together, the rural group is 
significantly more punitive than the urban group overall (see Tables 14, 15 and 16). Indeed, a 
significantly greater percentage of rural respondents fell into the more punitive distribution 
while a significantly greater percentage of urban respondents fell into the less punitive 
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distribution. For instance, in 2004, 63.4 percent of rural respondents fell into the more 
punitive distribution compared to only 54.1 percent of urban respondents. Conversely, a 
significantly greater percentage of urban respondents fell into the less punitive distribution 
than rural respondents. For example, in 2015, 44 percent or rural respondents fell into this 
category compared to 59.8 percent of the urban respondents. Notably, when we collapse the 
cross-sectional data to explore the puntivity distribution over-time, we see a similar story: the 
rural holds significantly greater punitive attitudes than the urban at 59.8 percent and 48.4 
percent respectively. However, while the urban indicates a significant trend towards 








2004 2008 2011 2015 
Rural 
participants 
More punitive n 426 509 349 223 1507 
% 63.4% 58.7% 60.1% 56.0% 59.8% 
Less punitive n 246 358 232 175 1011 
% 36.6% 41.3% 39.9% 44.0% 40.2% 
Trend .03 Total n 672 867 581 398 2518 




Punitivity index YEAR Total 
2004 2008 2011 2015 
Urban 
participants  
More punitive n 277 284 247 202 1010 
% 54.1% 49.7% 49.2% 40.2% 48.4% 
Less punitive n 235 287 255 300 1077 
% 45.9% 50.3% 50.8% 59.8% 51.6% 
Trend <.001 
 
Total n 512 571 502 502 2087 






Bivariate analyses were also conducted on demographic variables of education, 
gender and age to determine associations with punitive attitudes. In chi square analyses 
education was significantly associated with punitive attitudes (p<.001) while the association 
with gender approached significance (p=.06). Age was not significantly associated with 
punitive attitudes (p=.12). These results seem to replicate fairly consistently from study to 
study (see King & Maruna, 2009; Roberts et al., 2012; Applegate, Cullen, & Fisher, 2002). 
 






More punitive 1507 (59.8) 1168 (48.4) 2675 (54.6) 
Less punitive 1011 (40.2) 1215 (51.6) 2226 (45.4) 
Total 2518 (100) 2383 (100) 4901 (100) 
Chi-square = 57.9, 1, p <.001 
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A logistic regression analysis was performed to determine independent predictors of 
punitive attitudes (see Table 17). Gender, education and age were including in the model. 
Controlling for age, gender and education, the residential location of participants is still 
clearly associated with attitudes to punitiveness. People from urban locations were 1.27 times 
more likely to have less punitive attitudes than people in rural locations. However, education 
does appear to play a significant role. Compared to people with up to a high-school level 
education, those with a college education were 1.66 times more likely to have less punitive 
attitudes while university educated were more than four times more likely to have less 
punitive attitudes. Gender was associated with punitive attitudes with females being slightly 





Logistic Regression B(S.E) Exp(B) Sig. 
Location (urban) .24 (.07) 1.27 <.001 
Gender (female) .13 (.07) 1.14 .05 
Education up to high school 
(Ref) 
 1.00  
College or some university .51 (.09) 1.66 <.001 
Completed bachelor degree or 
higher 
1.53 (.08) 4.62 <.001 




The data suggests that Canadians have mixed views on questions of punishment, 
showing support or a lack thereof for punitive and non-punitive measures alike. However, 
when we hone in, the data indicates significant variations dependent upon geographical 
location across all dimensions of punitiveness. With regards to the goals of punishment, the 
rural favoured punishing violent young offenders significantly more than the urban. While 
both classifications favoured limiting the rights of offenders in the name of cracking down on 
crime, the rural support was significantly greater than that of the urban. Finally, the rural 
support of the death penalty was significantly greater than the urban classifications.  
 
Furthermore, the punitivity index indicates that, holistically, the rural holds much 
greater punitive attitudes than the urban. While education appears to play a role in the 
development of punitive attitudes across the sample, when controlling for education, age and 
gender, the residential location of participants remains strongly associated with punitive 
attitudes. Notably, while the data indicates a significant trend towards a decrease in punitive 
attitudes in Canada as a whole, no significant trend appears in the rural. Subsequently, as the 
urban is driving reductions in punitive attitudes, the gap between the rural and urban appears 
to be growing.  
 
Webster and Doob (2015) theorised that through a decade of the Conservative 
government’s repeated valorisation of punitive values, the underlying normative structure of 
Canadian society may have begun to change. However, the data presented in this article 
suggests that, in aggregate, Canadians appear to be becoming less punitive even during this 
decade of penal populism. In this regard, it is also important to note once again that, in 
contrast to other countries where penal populism has tended to dominant political life, in 
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Canada the Conservatives constituted only one voice among many as there were loud pockets 
of resistance to this ‘new punitiveness’, especially in the media, legal and, to a lesser extent, 
political spheres (Mulrooney, 2018). For example, Mulrooney (2018) has previously argued 
that the overwhelming presence of a counter discourse in the media specifically meant not 
only that the public arena was not saturated with populist discourse alone, but also that the 
public was presented with an alternative perspective from which they could form opinions 
and perceptions surrounding issues of crime and punishment.  
 
At the same time, the fact that this overall reduction in punitive attitudes was led by 
the urban is perhaps not all that surprising when we consider that those who live in rural 
communities in Canada tend to support conservative parties (Roy, Perrella & Borden, 2015) 
and that part of the explanation may lie in differences in attitudes towards punishment and 
within perspectives of morality more broadly (Cutler & Jenkins, 2000). This reinforces the 
need to differentiate between penal culture, and how this may be shaped by national identity 
(in the macro sense) and ‘penal cultures’ (in the micro sense), which may be further shaped 
by identification with or allegiance to a more regionalised, localised and individualised 
identities.  
 
With this in mind, in an effort to explore why it is that the rural areas tend to hold 
more punitive attitudes than the urban, future research should seek to move beyond the 
demographic factors controlled for here and explore a number of variables which have been 
correlated with punitive attitudes and punitiveness more broadly. For instance, fear of crime 
(see Kury, 2008; Kury & Winterdyk, 2013; Armborst, 2017), the perceptions that crime is 
rising (Garland, 2001, 2013; Costelloe, Chiricos & Gertz, 2009) and a lack of confidence in 
the criminal justice system (Chapman, Mirrlees-Black & Brawn, 2002; Jones & 
Weatherburn, 2010; Caplow & Simon, 1999; Tonry, 2004; Pratt & Clark, 2005) have also 
been shown to increase punitivity. Additionally, Durkheimian notions of trust and solidarity 
(see Kennedy, 2000; Pratt & Eriksson, 2013; Karstedt, 2014, 2015) as well as individual 
values such as one’s religiosity (Unnever, Cullen & Applegate, 2005; Unnever, Cullen & 
Bartkowski, 2006;  Baker & Booth, 2016) or political allegiances (Tonry, 1999; Jacobs & 
Helms, 1996; Beckett & Western, 2001; Smith, 2004; Yates & Fording, 2005; Loader & 
Sparks, 2016) have likewise been shown to shape punitive attitudes (Lappi-Seppälä, 2008, 
2011, 2012). Importantly, these variables themselves and their relationship to punitive 
attitudes are no doubt closely related to geography (see Gray & O’Connor, 1990; Yarwood & 
Gardnner, 2000).  
 
With consideration to political values specifically, the (growing) gap between the 
urban/rural on punitivity aligns with the notion that the urban/rural divide is one of the 
greatest political fault lines in present day politics. Indeed, there are a variety of socio-
cultural and economic explanations for why the rural may be ‘primed for populism’ (see 
Goldman et al., 2018; Cox, Lienesch & Jones, 2017). In the Canadian context particularly, 
the growing population concentration in a small number of major urban centres and the 
subsequent consolidation of economic, political and social power has exacerbated this 
disconnect in recent years (Speer & Jivani, 2017). To this end, future research should focus 
attention on exploring the nexus between punitive attitudes and aspects of populist appeal in 
the urban/rural context more generally (Bialik, 2018; Beckett, 2016). For instance, punitive 
attitudes have been positively correlated with economic insecurity, particularly among white 
males who are less well educated and earn less income (Costelloe et al, 2009), and 
punitiveness at the micro and macro level has been linked to negative views of immigrants 
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and immigration (see von Hofer, 2003; Ruddell, 2005; Unnever & Cullen, 2010; Brown & 
Piscitelli, 2016).  
 
Theoretically speaking, the premise is that the penal populism which became 
dominant in many Western countries in the 1990s and through the 2000s served as the 
foundations of the more general resurgence of political populism in the early twenty first 
century (see Pratt & Miao, 2017). Indeed, penal populism represents an attack on reason, and 
by proxy on the experts, elites and ‘soft-on-crime’ politicians who advance penal moderation, 
in the name of a ‘common sense’ and democratized approach to crime and punishment. 
Likewise, political populism brings a similar political logic, with the target often being 
corrupt liberal elites more generally represented by, for example, rhetoric around ‘draining 
the swamp’ or ‘liberal elites’ contrasted to the ‘the pure and noble people’ (Mudde, 2004; 
Judis, 2016). Notably, the right-wing variations of these populisms, which have dominated 
the politics of law and order and have been most successful thus far in recent Western 
contexts, not only champion ‘the people’ but tend to do so against an elite they accuse of 
coddling a third group whether that third group be, for instance, immigrants or refugees in the 
context of political populism or offenders in the case of penal populism.  
 
This shared political logic, the presence of a freer flowing political populism (Pratt & 
Miao, 2017) and the political gulf between the urban and the rural suggests that answers as to 
why it is that the rural holds more punitive attitudes than the urban may be found by 
exploring this phenomenon as a commitment to a broader political project (see Roy, Perrella 
& Borden, 2015). Indeed, as Loader and Sparks (2016, p. 316) suggest, “disputes over crime 
and its control are inescapably entangled with wider questions about the power and limits of 
authority, the allocation of social goods and the terms of collective coexistence”.  
 
The empirical effort then is to tease out particular values that are called upon and 
inform attitudes towards crime and punishment, to delineate whether or not these attitudes are 
related to populist thinking more broadly, and in what ways signify a shared political logic 
and commitment between penal populism and political populism, and ultimately how this 
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